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This study examines the characteristics of the venture capital industry in Australia.
Our analysis is based on responses by thirty-two venture capitalist firms to a comprehensive
questionnaire conducted in 2001. We observe that, on average, a venture capital firm has
been operating for five years and consists of six investment executives with two specialist
investment executives. Each firm has, on average, two formal layers in its investment
decision-making process indicating two checkpoints to control risk. With respect to
investment appraisal issues, it was noticed that the valuation methods based on discounted
cash flows, recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector and capitalized
maintainable earning (EBIT multiple), are the most important valuation techniques. It was
further found that the resolution of information asymmetries through the overall coherence
of the business plan and the venture capitalist’s own due diligence report were important
across the industry when preparing a valuation. Venture capital firms sought to meet a
standard benchmark rate of return on equity, on average, the target rate of return was 29%
p.a. after tax. Several factors that would lead to vary targeted rates of returns were
investigated as well.
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Introduction
The importance of the valuation that a venture capitalist arrives at cannot be
understated. The valuation of investment proposals is important because the value of the
company determines the proportion of equity the venture capitalists receive for their
investments, which in return set the eventual proceeds to the providers of capital (Manigart
et al. 1997). In appraising potential investments, venture capitalists are often faced with
both uncertainty and adverse selection problems. Uncertainty arises due to problems in
forecasting future performance, and adverse selection arises because venture capitalists
have to rely greatly on information about the enterprise’s state of affairs supplied by the
entrepreneur. In appraising investment proposals, venture capitalists seek ways to reduce
both types of risk. Venture capitalists use a wide range of information and techniques that
are likely to include unpublished accounting information and subjective information
(Wright et al. 1996 & Manigart et al. 1997). They also expend considerable effort verifying
the accuracy of the information provided. Due to the existence of information asymmetries,
the entrepreneur only discloses what is deemed necessary in order to get funding and may
deliberately or inadvertently withholding important information and/or giving biased
portrayals of important facts (Sahlman, 1990; Amit et al., 1993). The venture capitalist is
therefore likely to place more importance on reports issued by people other than the
entrepreneur (e.g. independent accountants or auditors), in order to supplement the
accounting figures and information provided (Manigart et al., 1997).
However, the use of this information may vary depending on the emphasis different
venture capitalists put on the stage of investment and on the structure of the venture capital
industry prevailing in a country. As cross-country studies of venture capitalists (Sapienza, et
al., 1996; Manigart et. al, 1997; Manigart et. al., 2000) have demonstrated, venture
capitalists behave differently in different geographical markets, suggesting that venture
capital markets are not homogeneous. The structure of the industry can significantly
influence the importance of the information drawn on during the screening and the
valuation processes. Bygrave et al. (1992, 1999) show that, for instance, the US venture
capital market invests a substantially greater proportion of funds into the earlier stage
ventures than is the case in Europe, suggesting a greater need to emphasize the skills of the
entrepreneur and the market prospect of a new product. In the UK market, Wright et al.
(1996b) demonstrated that the skills required for the early as opposed to the buy-out stages
of a venture capital market are markedly different. Other studies (Elango et al. (1995) &
Wright et al. (1998)) show that the relative importance of different investment stages and
organizational structure of venture capitalist firms influence both valuations and the general
behaviour (e.g. monitoring practices) of venture capitalists. Due to the unlisted nature of the
potential investee firm, the business plan and its’ projections, together with historical
accounting data (especially cash flow forecasts) can become one of the venture capitalist’s
most important sources of information (MacMillian et al., 1985 & MacMillian, et al.,
1987). In the case of start-ups however, such information may be subject to considerable
error and variation forcing venture capitalists to place great reliance on evidence concerning
an entrepreneur’s track record as a means to gauge the likelihood of success (Macmillian et
al., 1987 & Amit et al. 1993).
This study investigates the dominant features of the venture capital market, its main
participants and the valuation and investment appraisal methods employed by venture
capitalists in Australia. The approach to gathering data for our investigation parallels that
used by Wright et al. (1996a), Manigart et al. (1997) & Manigart et al. (2000) who
surveyed the venture capital industry in multiple countries. In their original study, Wright et
al. (1996a), the authors developed the questionnaire that all the subsequent studies have
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used, including the present study1. Wright et al. set out to “add to the understanding of
venture capitalists’ investment decision-making behaviour by providing evidence relating to
the general policies they adopt in their approaches to due diligence, valuation methods,
benchmark rates of return and adjustments for risk”. The authors found that “in order to
address potential adverse selection problems, venture capitalists use a wide range of
accounting and non-accounting information and techniques relating to the specific factors
concerning a particular investment.” Similar to the prior studies, our main objective in this
paper is to add to the understanding of venture capitalists’ investment decision-making
behaviour in Australia.
We identified 106 venture capital firms in Australia, to whom questionnaires were
sent. After follow-up phone calls, we ultimately received 33 usable responses representing a
response rate of slightly more than 30%. The surveys covered a broad range of topics
consisting of 19 questions relating to the topics of due diligence, valuation methods, sources
of information and factors affecting rates of return. Much of the survey data was collected
using a closed set of intervals where the respondents were asked to indicate their company’s
policy. These scales were numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 and the indications of the respondents
were analysed by investigation of the mean and standard deviation of the responses.
Survey Results
The analysis of results is broken up into three broad sections. Firstly, several
characteristics of the venture capital industry and firms are studied. Secondly, due diligence,
valuation methods and sources of information used in valuations are investigated. Finally,
the targeted rates of return required by the venture capitalists and the adjustments made to
them due to the stages of investment and various risk factors are examined.
The Australian Venture Capital Marketplace
Our investigation of the Australian marketplace based on the answers given by the
participating VC firms revealed the presence of a range of organisational types. We
observed that the dominant venture capital form in Australia is the privately funded venture
capital or independent firms which constituted about 55% of the industry. Next about 25%
is the captive funds, where a parent company provides funds. Then around 15% is the
affiliated funds, where a parent company provides funds but the VC firm has high degree of
independence. Finally about 3% is government funded.
Australian venture capital firms invest fairly evenly among seed / start-up / early
stage, expansion / development, and later stages like management buy-out. The average
fund size of an Australian venture capitalist in our survey was roughly AU $30 million over
the period 1998-2000.
Table 1 reports the average number of years an investment was held by VC firms for
different stages of financing. The seed / start-up / early stage ventures are on average held
for 4.35 years and are held for longer than any other investment stages.
Our results further indicate that the Australian VC firms prefer not to make
investments of less than AU$100,000. They rather tend to invest close to 50% of their funds
in ventures requiring between AU $1 million and AU $5 million, with 25% of all
investments being less than AU $1 million and 27% of investments for ventures requiring
over AU$5 million. Bearing in mind the average fund size (AU$30 million), it may be that
the time requirement for a venture capitalist to evaluate small deals (of less than

1

The authors would like to sincerely thank Mike Wright for supplying them with the questionnaire. Some modifications
were introduced to this in order to reflect the particularities of the Australian venture capital market.
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AU$100,000 in capital) cannot be justified given the amount of capital the venture capitalist
needs to “put to work”.
Australian venture capitalists do make investments outside of their own country.
However, the vast majority, more than 85% of investment is within the domestic market.
The implication is that the Australian domestic market contains sufficient investment
opportunities, or that Australian venture capitalists tend not to have the time / available
resources to investigate international opportunities. The number of investments made in
Australia’s closest neighbour (New Zealand) is equivalent to the number of investments
made in the more established markets of the United States and the United Kingdom.
On average Australia’s venture capital firms have been operating for about 5 years
at the time of this investigation. However there is considerable variation in age amongst the
individual firms, the standard deviation being 4.14. This finding indicates a rather young
and growing venture capital industry in Australia. The average number of investments made
over the last three years per firm is 9.33, however, individual firm investments vary greatly.
Each firm currently holds on average 8.5 investments and acts as the lead investor in 5 of
their investments.
Most Australian venture capitalists operate from one or two offices, and employ
close to 6 investment executives, of whom two-thirds are directly responsible for
monitoring portfolio investments, however, in most firms less than 20% of investment
executives are solely responsible for portfolio monitoring. This means that in Australia the
majority of investment executives are generalists involved in fund raising, investment
appraisal or like activities, as well as portfolio monitoring. Interestingly, each firm tends to
have one specialist investment executive involved in portfolio monitoring and one specialist
investment executive involved in fund raising and investment appraisal.
With respect to the investment appraisal activity of a firm, over half of the venture
capitalists report having two formal decision making layers, a further 23% having three
layers and 17% having only one formal layer.
Valuation
Methods
Various valuation methods are employed and advocated by academics and
practitioners. There are, generally, three classes of valuation methods: methods based on
expected future cash flows; methods based on accounting information; and methods based
on comparables companies’ ratios. However, there is some diversity around these basics
methods of valuation, including identifying recent prices paid for similar transactions in
same sector. Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviations of respondents’ answers to
questions on valuation methods. The respondents were asked to rank 13 possible valuation
techniques on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 “almost never used” and 5 “almost always used”.
The most noticeable trend about valuation methods, as reported in Table 2, is the tendency
for venture capitalists to use the more formal financial valuation technique such as
discounted cash flows. Next, is to gather the details of recent transaction prices in the same
sector. Then venture firms use various comparable companies’ multiples. The least used
methods are those associated with liquidation and replacement costs. This is to be expected
as these methods have least appeal for the type of investment venture capitalists are
interested in.
Interestingly, Australian venture capitalists employ over half of the valuation
methods listed in the questionnaire, suggesting the range of methods for valuation purposes
is quite broad. It can be further observed from Table 3 that venture capital firms place the
greatest weight on one particular method and use others as a check.
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This preference far exceeds the preference shown for all the other approaches
questioned. It is noticeable that venture capitalists hardly use the highest valuation arrived
at.
There is wide variation between the countries in the use of valuation methods
(Manigart et al. 2000). The most popular valuation techniques are prospective or historic
price/earning multiples in the United Kingdom, EBIT multiples and recent transaction
prices in the sector in the United States, discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques in Belgium
and the Netherlands and responses to solicit bids for the potential investee or recent
transaction prices in France. Our findings for Australia are very similar to those in Belgium
and Netherlands.
Due Diligence
One of the main avenues available to the venture capitalists to reduce adverse
selection problems and the future uncertainty inherent in a potential project is through due
diligence. They may expend considerable efforts to ensure the robustness of any accounting
information. The most significant finding in regards to due diligence information as
reported in Table 4 is that venture capitalists find it essential to carry out their own market
evaluations. VCs also consider it important to use independent market and accountants’
reports. Overall, we found that all listed questions related to due diligence have been
considered important by the respondents, suggesting a broad scope taken when conducting
due diligence analysis. Interestingly, as a whole, venture capitalists only consider it
moderately important to terminate proposals where inadequate performance is available.
This response suggests that venture capitalists are interested in current performance, but that
they do not necessarily believe that future performance will be poor if current performance
is not satisfactory.
In terms of risk, these factors imply that reducing information asymmetry is the most
important objective, both by their own sources and by professional analysts (independent
reports), followed by reducing moral hazard problems through personal references, and then
termination of projects with inadequate performance.
Sources of Information
Venture capitalists attach great significance to financial information and information
relating to entrepreneurs and their track records when evaluating investment proposals.
Sapienza et al. (1996) shows, however, that in countries where the VC markets are
relatively young, venture firms will rely more on financial and accounting information,
while countries with more mature VC markets put more emphasis on information on the
entrepreneur and the management team, or market and product information. Australian
venture capitalists were asked to rank 22 possible sources of financial and non-financial
information, with 1=never used and 5=always used; the information sources are ordered in
Table 5 from most used to least used. It can be observed that the overall coherence of the
business plan and the venture capitalists own due diligence report are of vital influence in
preparing a valuation. This importance is consistent across the industry as the low values of
their respective standard deviations indicate. The two next most preferred sources of
information, considered of significant influence across the industry, were sales and
marketing information and the business plan: profit & loss account. The importance of these
two approaches suggests that Australian venture capitalists value both immediate financial
strength as well as a growth prospects when evaluating potential new ventures. As a general
theme, business plan information tended to be more important than third party information,
but less important than their own due diligence and sales and marketing information. Apart
from financial figures, the moral hazard issues receive a range of rankings with curriculum
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vitae ranked highly, down to interviews with company personnel which rated only
moderately important. Further the use of outside professionals varies from important for due
diligence by accounting / consulting firms to only moderately important by other venture
capitalists.
Comparing these findings with those of Manigart et al. 2000, it is interesting to note
that the first two factors are also among the most important sources of information in
several countries investigated. They found that the firm’s own due diligence report, except
in France, where this item is rated second, is the first source of information. The overall
coherence of the business plan is the most important piece of information in France, second
in United States and third in United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands. Telling a good
story appears to be important everywhere when trying to raise capital.
Target Rates of Return
In setting their target rates of return, venture capitalists usually have an initial
requirement for a general benchmark against which proposals need to be gauged. Wright
and Robbie (1996a), argue, however, that given the wide variety of possible types of
investment candidates, venture capitalists may or may not apply a fixed benchmark to all of
them. Hence the need to investigate the extent to which venture capitalists follow a
changing target rate of return policy. The factors that might lead to this could be related to a
range of factors like industry, length of investment, economic and financial markets
conditions, etc.. These issues are investigated in this section.
Benchmark After-Tax Return
Of the respondents whose firms sought to meet a standard benchmark rate of return
on equity a mean value of 29% after tax was given as the standard benchmark. Variations in
this benchmark were investigated to find whether firms that managed both closed end funds
as well as other sources of finance (e.g. own resources), vary their required internal rate of
return (IRR). We found that no Australian venture capitalists made such a distinction.
Wright and Robbie (1996) also found that the benchmark return used by the UK VC firms
was 29.2%.
Required Rate of Return by Stage
Australian venture capitalists use a range of rates of return when evaluating ventures
at different stages. Table 6 reports the return that venture capitalists would require for each
investment stage. We note that for seed, start-up and early stage projects venture capitalists
use a median rate of return of 46 - 55% p.a. There is, however, some variation on this target
return, with three-quarters of the venture capitalists indicating target returns ranging from
the 36% - 45% p.a. bracket up to the above 55% p.a. bracket.
We find the expansion/development, classified under later stage in Table 6, ventures
are evaluated using a median target rate of return of 26 – 35% p.a. that is subject to
variations throughout the industry (although the variation here is smaller than for early stage
ventures). Two-thirds of Australian venture capitalists have a target rate of return that falls
in the below 20% p.a. up to the 31 to 35% p.a. bracket.
Management Buy-In (MBI) and Management Buy-Out (MBO) responses show
similar medians to the later stage expansion/development rates of return. Management buyin has a mean of about 30% p.a. with a median rate of return in the 31 to 35% p.a. range.
Management buy-outs, while also having about a 30% p.a. mean, have a median response in
the 25 to 30% p.a. range (slightly lower than the MBI median).
As a body, Australian venture capitalists favour target rates of return policies that
require investments to meet a standard rate of return on equity and disfavour policies that
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require funding structures to meet standard gearing ratios. The most important factor, as
shown in Table 7, recognised by the industry was that venture capitalists require
investments to meet standard required rates of return on equity according to the risk band of
the investment with over half of the venture capitalists responding that it was important or
essential. The second most important factor was to require investments to meet standard
required rates of return on equity according to the characteristics of each investment.
The assessment of target rates of return was further investigated for factors that
would cause variations to the targeted rates of return as shown in Table 8. The respondents
were asked to rank from 5, almost always, to 1, never, those factors that deem to warrant
adjusting their required return. The most preferred reasons for varying a targeted rate of
return was due to market conditions relating to the proposal and the expected length of
investment in a particular proposal. Both of these factors usually caused over half of the
venture capitalists to vary their rate of return. The third most preferred reason to vary rates
of returns was due to the actual cash amount invested in a particular proposal.
It was found that venture capitalists seldom varied their rates of return. As a general
theme changes in market / economic / sector conditions were more likely to cause changes
in venture capitalist rates of return than changes in capital market conditions.
Assessment of Riskiness
To assess the riskiness of a project, seven items were recognized as possible
indicators of the riskiness of a project. The VC firms were asked to rank these items on a
five-point scale as with 1 being “irrelevant” and 5 “extremely important”. Australian
venture capitalists emphasised equally most important the contribution of management in
terms of their managerial skills and emphasise on the nature of the product market of the
company. Also rated as important by over half of the venture capitalists is the expected time
horizon till they exit the company. These three factors most emphasise the factors that affect
the risk in a venture. The least emphasised factor was expected dividend yield (2.30), rated
as only having slight importance when assessing the risk of an investment, a finding that is
consistent with venture capitalists seeking a return through growth.
Conclusions
This study examined a number of characteristics of the venture capital industry in
Australia. Our analysis is based on responses by thirty-two venture capital firms to a
comprehensive questionnaire. We observed, a venture capital firm has been operating for
approximately five years. Slightly, more than half of the VC firms are independent, and
about one third are captive, i.e., affiliated to a financial institution or an industrial parent
firm. A firm typically consists of six investment executives with two specialist investment
executives. Each firm has, on average, two formal layers in its investment decision-making
process, indicating two checkpoints to control for risks inherent in the types of investment
undertaken by venture capital firms. With respect to the valuation methods employed by the
VC firms, our analysis revealed that the modern finance method, discounted cash flows, and
recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector and capitalized maintainable earning
(EBIT multiple), are the most important approaches, suggesting that they are perceived as
the best methods to reduce the likelihood of adverse selection. In addition, we noticed that
the majority of methods of valuation proposed were used, suggesting the range of valuation
methods used among the venture capitalists is quite broad. Furthermore, the importance
placed on using one particular method of valuation and then using other methods as checks
suggests a self checking process is in place.
The second aspect of the valuation process we considered were the sources of
information. It was concluded that resolution of information asymmetries through the
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overall coherence of the business plan and the venture capitalist’s own due diligence report
were vital across the industry when preparing a valuation. We also found that the Australian
venture capitalists seem interested in both the existing financial health of the venture as well
as its growth prospects, consistently scoring business plan aspects above the other sources
tested. Interestingly, the moral hazard issues receive a range of rankings with curriculum
vitae ranked highly, down to interviews with company personnel which rated only
moderately important.
It was further found that respondents whose firms sought to meet a standard
benchmark rate of return on equity, on average, target a rate of return of 29% p.a. after tax.
Empirically, we observed that seed, start-up and early stage ventures have a targeted rate of
return of 46 – 55% p.a., that expansion and development ventures have a targeted rate of
return of 26 – 30% p.a., and that management buy-outs and management buy-ins have a
targeted rate of return of 30% p.a.
Investigating policy requirements in the assessment of target rates of return, we
noticed that, as a body, venture capitalists favour target rates of return policies that require
investments to meet a standard rate of return on equity. When considering policy factor
variations, it was shown that market risk (changes in market/economic/sector conditions) is
the most important reason to vary targeted returns and generally caused changes in venture
capitalist rates of return more often than did changes in capital market conditions did.
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Table 1
Holding Period of Financing by Stage

Mean Score

Std. Dev.

Seed / start-up / early stage

4.35yr

1.16

Expansion / development

3.78yr

1.31

Management buy-out

3.55yr

1.42

Management buy-in

3.18yr

1.50

Secondary purchase / Replacement

2.78yr

1.64

Table 2
Methods Used in Valuing Potential Investments

(N = 30)
Discounted future cash flows
Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector
Capitalized maintainable earnings (EBIT multiple)
Capitalized maintainable earnings (P/E multiple)
(Prospective basis)
Industry's special 'rule of thumb' pricing ratios (e.g.
turnover ratios)
Responses to attempts to solicit bids for the potential
investee
Capitalized maintainable earnings (P/E multiple)
(historic basis)
Liquidation value of assets (orderly sale)
Recent P/E ratio of the parent company's shares
Historic cost book value
Dividend Yield basis
Liquidation value of assets (forced sale)
Replacement cost asset value
Note: Where 5 = Almost always used and 1 = Almost never used

Mean Score
3.83
3.72
3.57
3.21

Std. Dev.
1.23
1.10
1.25
1.29

3.07

1.12

3.03

1.30

2.97

1.35

2.34
2.31
2.23
2.21
2.07
2.00

1.34
1.39
1.48
1.24
1.19
1.25
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Table 3
Selection of Final/Benchmark Valuation

(N = 28)
Mean Score
Place greatest weight on one particular method and use 4.00
others as a check
Use the median value
2.85
Use the lowest value
2.48
Use the average valuation
2.46
Use the highest valuation
1.63

Std. Dev.
1.15
1.35
1.23
1.14
0.92

Note: Where 5 =Almost always and 1 = Almost never

Table 4
Sources of Due Diligence Information

(N = 32)
Mean Score
Carry out our own market evaluation
4.59
Always obtain independent (from business plan) market 3.97
reports
Always have independent accountant’s report
3.97
Place great reliance on personal references
3.48
Terminate proposals where inadequate current 3.39
performance is available
Note: Where 5 = Essential and 1 = Irrelevant

Std. Dev.
0.61
1.00
1.20
1.15
1.38
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Table 5
Sources of Information in Preparing a Valuation

(N = 31)
Business plan: Overall coherence of business plan
Own due diligence report
Sales and marketing information
Business plan: profit & loss account
Proposed exit timing and method
Curriculum Vitae of management
Business plan: balance sheet
Due diligence by accounting / consulting firms
Business plan: unaudited management projections (1
year ahead)
Product information
Production capacity / technical information
Interviews with entrepreneurs
Business plan: unaudited 'latest period' financial
statements
Business plan: unaudited management projections (more
than 1 year ahead)
Business plan: qualified audit report
Interviews with company personnel
Business plan: unqualified audit report
Other venture capitalists
Statistical and informational services
Government industry statistics
Trade journals
Financial press
Note: Where 5 = Vital Influence and 1 = No Influence

Mean Score
4.74
4.65
4.17
4.16
4.07
4.07
4.03
4.00
3.93

Std. Dev.
0.51
0.61
0.87
0.97
0.92
0.92
0.91
0.86
1.01

3.86
3.83
3.81
3.76

1.03
0.93
1.11
0.91

3.68

1.12

3.66
3.57
3.37
3.36
3.33
3.00
2.97
2.69

1.08
1.25
0.96
1.10
1.03
1.20
1.05
1.07
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Table 6
Rate of Return on Equity by Stage

Below 20% p.a.
21 to 25% p.a.
26 to 30% p.a.
31 to 35% p.a.
36 to 45% p.a.
46 to 55% p.a.
Above 55% p.a.
Total
Sample size

Later stage
11%
11%
33%
33%
11%
0%
0%
100%
9

MBO
8%
17%
33%
33%
0%
8%
0%
100%
12

MBI
6%
11%
33%
33%
11%
6%
0%
100%
18

Early stage
0%
0%
11%
11%
16%
21%
42%
100%
19

Table 7
Assessment of Target Rates of Return

(N = 31)
Require investment to meet standard required rate of
return on equity according to the risk band of the
investment
Require investment to meet standard required rate of
return on equity according to the characteristics of each
investment
Require a rate of return which yields a total cash return
commensurate with amount invested
Require the funding structure to meet standard gearing
ratios appropriate to each investment
Require investment to meet standard required rate of
return on equity regardless of the investee company's
risk profile
Require the funding structure to meet standard gearing
ratios according to the risk band of the investment
Require the funding structure to meet standard gearing
ratios
Note: Where 5 = Essential and 1 = Irrelevant

Mean Score
4.03

Std. Dev.
1.05

3.97

1.02

3.68

1.28

3.39

1.36

3.26

1.09

2.94

1.39

2.81

1.30
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Table 8
Targeted Return Variations

(N = 31)
Market conditions relating to a particular proposal
The expected length of investment in a particular
proposal
The actual cash amount invested in a particular proposal
The industry/product sector of the investment
The general economic conditions
Whether you have a majority of the equity
The expected gearing ratio when the finance is structured
The actual cash amount you seek to receive from an
investment
Changes in returns for quoted equities
The geographical region of the investment
Changes in base rates
Changes in returns for long term government bonds

Mean Score
3.91
3.77

Std. Dev.
1.06
1.02

3.44
3.37
3.16
3.10
3.00
2.97

1.13
1.22
1.04
1.18
1.13
0.95

2.87
2.74
2.42
2.35

1.02
1.32
1.12
1.11

Note: Where 5 = Almost always and 1 = Never

Table 9
Assessment of the Riskiness of Investment

(N = 31)
Contribution of management in terms of their managerial
skills
Nature of the product market of the company
Expected time horizon to exit of company
Nature of the capital markets
Financial contribution of management
Expected time horizon to redemption of preference
shares
Expected participating dividend yield
Note: Where 5 = Extremely important and 1 = Irrelevant

Mean Score
4.39

Std. Dev.
0.72

4.39
3.87
3.35
3.33
3.17

0.92
0.78
0.91
0.96
1.26

2.30

1.18

